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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL W. THORSTENSEN, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent_, 
I Case No. 9899 SID WEESE, vs. Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set out in the Appellant's 
brief and the facts stated in the Appellant's Disposi-
tion in Lower Court are inconsistent with the facts 
stated in the record. 
The record discloses that the Appellant and Re-
spondent entered into a stock purchase agreement on 
December 28, 1961, wherein the Respondent agreed 
to sell to the Appellant 64 shares of stock in Ogden 
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Utah Knitting Company at the agreed price of $50.00 
per share and for a total sum of $3,200.00. The terms 
of the agreement provided that $2,000.00 would be 
paid to the Respondent at the time the agreement was 
executed and the remaining $1,200.00 would be paid 
at $100.00 per month beginning with January 31, 1962. 
The Respondent received the $2,000.00 down payment 
and the January and February, 1962, installments. 
The Appellant refused to pay the remaining ten in-
stallments and the Respondent brought an action for 
Breach of Contract and was awarded $1,000.00 for 
damages by the Trial Court. 
The Appellant and Respondent, at the time of 
entering into the purchase agreement, were officers of 
the Company. The Appellant was hired by the Com-
pany in February, 1956, as the Comptroller and later 
he became the Secretary of the Company. In October 
of 1961 he became the Manager of the Company; 
throughout the entire period, he received a salary (Tr. 
20, 24) . The Respondent was Vice President of the 
Company and was inactive and was nothing more than 
Vice President in name only (Tr. 5, Tr. 24). 
In the latter part of January, 1962, it was deter-
mined by the Company's Accountant that the Corpora-
tion sustained an operating loss of $159,289.00 for the 
year 1961, the loss was not determined in July, 1962 
(Tr. 52). The accountant testified that during the 
period of July, 1961 to January, 1962 there were cer-
tain factors indicating that the Corporation was in 
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financial difficulty and may collapse. The accountant 
testified that during this period there was a shortage 
of cash and the management should have observed that 
factor (Tr. 60). The Appellant during this period 
was the Manager of the Company, and had control of 
the books and was working with the books every day 
('fr. 25). The accountant further testified that he 
could have determined the approximate value of the 
shares of stock in the Company in December of 1961 
if a physical inventory would have been taken (Tr. 
57). 
The Appellant offered to purchase said shares of 
stock at the price of $50.00 per share and the-Appellant 
made his offer based upon his knowledge of the records 
of the Corporation, being active in the Corporation 
for over a five-year period and his being Secretary of 
the Company (Tr. 33). The Appellant prior to enter-
ing into the agreement had knowledge that the L.D.S. 
Church had been contacted concerning the sale of the 
assets of the Company to the Church (Tr. 37). Contact 
had been made with the Church up until February, 
1962 and the Appellant stated in February, 1962 that 
it looked like the Church was interested in taking over 
the Company and it looked as if the share holders, after 
paying all of the indebtedness, would come out with 
the shares of stock in the Company worth $70.00 per 
share. At the time the Appellant stated it looked as if 
the Church would take over the assets of the Company, 
the Appellant was not in default on the stock purchase 
agreement (Tr. 63). 
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STATEMENT OF POINT 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
THAT THE STOCK ON OR ABOUT DECEM-
BER 28,1961, HAD VALUE, AND BOTH PAR-
TIES WERE A_8SUMING THE RISK IN EN-
TERING INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND 
THERE WAS NOT A MUTUAL MISTAKE 
AS TO VALUE OF SAID STOCK. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
THAT THE STOCK ON OR ABOUT DECEM-
BER 28,1961, HAD VALUE, AND BOTH PAR-
TIES WERE ASSUMING THE RISK IN EN-
TERING INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND 
THERE WAS NOT A MUTUAL MISTAKE 
AS TO VALUE OF SAID STOCK. 
The eight statements of facts outlined in support 
of the Appellant's four points are inconsistent with the 
facts as indica ted in the record. 
The Appellant's second statement of fact that both 
the Appellant and Respondent believed as a fact that 
the stock had substantial value, is incorrect, in that the 
Respondent testified he did not have knowledge of the 
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value of the stock at the time of entering into the agree-
ment; the Appellant offered the Respondent the sum 
of $50.00 per share and the Respondent accepted that 
offer (Tr. 7). 
It is stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 132: 
"If parties to an agreement indicate an inten-
tion to be bound irrespective of the existence of 
certain facts and to take the risk of their non-
existence, the validity of their agreement is not 
at all dependent upon the existence of such facts. 
On the other hand, if the parties indicate an in-
tention not to be bound unless certain facts exist, 
the nonexistence of such facts prevents any con-
tractual duty, such facts being intended to oper-
ate, and operating, as a condition precedent to 
obligation. 
''Where the parties are conscious that the exist-
ence of particular facts is doubtful and make 
their agreement on this assumption, the non-
existence of such facts does not affect the validity 
of the agreement, the risk of their existence be-
ing taken by the party." Sears v. Grand Lodge, 
A.O.U.W. 163 NY 374, 57 N.E. 618, 50 LRA. 
204; Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 P. 1081, 
26 A.L.R. 523. 
In Corbin's Hornbook on Contracts in Section 
605, he discusses what is market value and what estab-
lishes market value and he states that each party is in 
the market when he contracts and the Section further 
states this language : 
''In making this contract of exchange, either 
party may be mistaken in his estimate of market 
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value, mistaken as to the appetite of others for 
the commodity. He finds that he can not sell 
for as much as he paid. Practically never is there 
such a mistake as will justify recission. The 
parties are conscious of the uncertainty of value. 
Value is one of the principle subjects of agree-
ment. Each party is consciously assuming the 
risk of error of judgment. As to this, by business 
custom, by prevailing mores, by social policy and 
by existing law, the rule is caveat emptor. It is 
also in equal degree, caveat emptor." 
The Appellant's third statement of fact that at the 
time the agreement was executed the stock had no value 
is untrue in that the L.D.S. Church had been contacted 
prior to the parties entering into the stock purchase 
agreement and the Church was interested in the pur-
chase of the assets of the Company up until the latter 
part of February, 1962. At this time the Appellant 
believed that each share of stock would have a value 
of $70.00 after all of the Company's indebtedness had 
been paid (Tr. 63). 
The Appellant's fourth statement of facts that 
the value of the stock could not be established by either 
the Appellant or the Respondent at or prior to the 
execution of the agreement is incorrect, in that the 
accountant testified that the Company had indication 
of a financial collapse between July, 1961 and January, 
1962 ( Tr. 60). The accountant further stated in his 
testimony that the value of the shares of stock could 
have been determined in December of 1961 if a physical 
inventory had been taken. During the aforesaid period 
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the Appellant was working with the books of the Com-
pany every day and was also managing its operation. 
The Appellant's sixth statement of facts that the 
Appellant relied upon the same source of information 
as the Respondent in fixing value is incorrect in that 
the Appellant had been a salaried full time employee 
with the Company as Comptroller for a period in excess 
of five years prior to his entering into the agreement, 
and he had also become the Secretary of the Company 
(Tr. 20, 24). In the fall of 1961 the Respondent became 
the acting Manager of the Company in addition to his 
other duties. During this period the Respondent was 
Vice President of the Company and played a very in-
active role in that the Respondent's occupation was that 
of a life insurance agent ( Tr. 4). 
It is stated in 19 Am. J ur., Equity, Section 57: 
"Where it appears that the parties to an in-
strument had equal knowledge or equal means 
of obtaining knowledge of the facts, and no sur-
prise or imposition is shown, the mistake is often 
held to lay no foundation for equitable interfer-
ence, being said to be strictly damnum absque 
injuria." Belt v. Mehen, 2 Cal. 159, 56 Am. Dec. 
329; Bibber v. Carville, 101 Me. 59, 63 A. 303, 
115 Am. St. Rep. 303; McCobb v. Richardson, 
24 Me. 82, 41 Am. Dec. 37 4. 
The general law in this area is further stated in 
19 Am. Jur., Equity, Section 58: 
"In some circumstances relief will not be 
granted upon a showing simply that the com-
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plainant, at the time of the disputed transaction, 
was ignorant of, or mistaken as to, some matter 
of fact; it must be made to appear that his ignor-
ance was excusable. The conclusion is that he 
is not entitled to relief where the evidence shows 
that he was "negligent" or that he could and 
would have ascertained the facts by the exercise 
of "due" or "reasonable diligence", or where he 
had "means of knowledge" or "might have as-
certained the truth". In other words, mistake 
to constitute equitable relief, must not be merely 
the result of inattention, personal negligence or 
misconduct on the party applying for relief. 
The issue as to whether the complainant did or 
did not exercise the requisite activity or diligence 
is not to be determined, of course, with reference 
to the facts and circumstances which attend the 
transaction. Where the complainant's mistake 
or ignorance of facts has brought about a legal 
situation which must result in loss or prejudice 
to one of the parties to the transaction, relief 
will be denied if the evidence shows that they 
were equally well situated to be informed as to 
the facts." 
There can be no doubt that the Appellant had 
much more information in fixing the value of the shares 
of stock than the Respondent. The applicable Utah 
law is stated in White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 Pac. 
927 (1909), wherein this Court said: 
"But where the parties in entering into a con-
tract stand upon an equality with respect to each 
other and with regard to the subject matter of 
the contract, courts ought not to interfere merely 
because one side or other must assume or dis-
charge a burden which was not anticipated when 
10 
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the contract was entered into, provided such a 
burden comes within the terms of the contract. 
If the business of the corporation had been 
profitable during the duration of the agreement 
in question, respondents no doubt would insist 
upon the terms of the agreement, and their right 
to have them enforced could not well be ques-
tioned so long as all of the stock holders receive 
the proportional benefits to which they were 
entitled. The mere fact that the enterprise re-
sulted in a loss is no reason why a Court should 
interfere." 
The Appellant's seventh statement of facts that 
there is no consideration for Appellant's promise to 
pay, and for the payments actually made is incorrect 
in that the Appellant was purchasing 64 shares of stock 
that had value at the time of entering into the agree-
ment. These shares had value up until February, 1962 
when the L.D.S. Church indicated they may buy all 
of the assets of the Company. 
The Appellant is asking for the rescission of the 
stock purchase agreement based upon equitable doc-
trines and in seeking rescission the complainant must 
act timely. The Appellant did not initiate an action for 
rescission when he learned of the financial collapse of 
the Company in the latter part of January, 1962. He 
elected to continue to make his monthly payments with 
the knowledge that the L.D.S. Church was interested 
in purchasing the assets of the Company and the pos-
sibility he could realize a handsome profit from the 
stock purchase agreement. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits his case on the facts in this 
case as disclosed by the record and the law applicable 
to the issues of this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIDWELL & FRANDSEN 
By Alan D. Frandsen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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